Model Development for Manufacturer Price and Retailer Service Competition in a Duopoly Common Retailer Channel
A model had been considered where there is price competition between two manufacturers and one retailer. Subsequently, this model was extended by including price competition between two manufacturers and two retailers. Moreover, price and service competition had been studied where there are two m...
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Format: | Thesis |
Language: | English English |
Published: |
2009
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://psasir.upm.edu.my/id/eprint/7338/1/FK_2009_20a.pdf |
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Summary: | A model had been considered where there is price competition between two
manufacturers and one retailer. Subsequently, this model was extended by including
price competition between two manufacturers and two retailers. Moreover, price and
service competition had been studied where there are two manufacturers producing
competing products and selling them through a common retailer. The consumer
demand depends on two factors: (1) retail price and (2) service level provided by the
manufacturer.
In this study, a channel structure in which there are duopoly manufacturers and
duopoly common retailers in competition between channel members under wholesale
price and retail’s margin and service provided by retailer was studied. Customer
demand depends on two factors: (1) price and (2) service level provided by the
retailer. Both of these manufacturers produce competing products and sell their
products to both common retailers. This study focuses on the role of service provided
by the retailer, how the bargaining power can affect the decision variables and
channel member’s profit, when there is competition between the retailers service and margin and manufacturers price (decision variables). To overcome this problem a
solution on the effect of bargaining power to supply chain equilibrium was studied.
The demand function model was developed by considering service by retailer in
duopoly retailer channel structure. The effect of bargaining power on equilibrium
solution when the manufacturer or the retailer is a leader, and the effect of increase
production cost and market base and price and service competition index on the
channel’s decision variables was determined. The game theory approach was used to
derive equilibrium solutions for wholesale prices, retailer margins and service, and
profits for each channel member. To study the effect of bargaining power in this
supply chain equilibrium solution, Manufacturer Stackelberg, Retailer Stackelberg,
and Vertical Nash were used. In this study, it was shown that customers receive the
least benefit from service when the retailer is leader. They are better off when the
manufacturer is leader. The effect of changes in price competition indexes (b p , θ p ),
service competition indexes (bs , θ s ), production cost ( ), and market base ( ) on
market sensitivity were analyzed. The result showed that when c of one
manufacturer increases, the firm can sell its product at a higher price and with lower
quantity but its competitor benefits. By increasing the market base of one of the
manufacturers, the wholesale and retail price increase. When customer tends to
choose a product with lower price, the manufacturer sells its product with lower
wholesale price. Since, it was assumed that the cost of providing service increases by
the power of 2, it is not economical to invest in service. Therefore, by increasing
ci aij
i θ sand bs the service level first increases and then decreases. |
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